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Abstract
Adversarial attacks that generate small Lp-norm pertur-
bations to mislead classifiers have limited success in black-
box settings and with unseen classifiers. These attacks are
also fragile with defenses that use denoising filters and to
adversarial training procedures. Instead, adversarial at-
tacks that generate unrestricted perturbations are more ro-
bust to defenses, are generally more successful in black-
box settings and are more transferable to unseen classifiers.
However, unrestricted perturbations may be noticeable to
humans. In this paper, we propose a content-based black-
box adversarial attack that generates unrestricted pertur-
bations by exploiting image semantics to selectively modify
colors within chosen ranges that are perceived as natural by
humans. We show that the proposed approach, ColorFool,
outperforms in terms of success rate, robustness to defense
frameworks and transferability five state-of-the-art adver-
sarial attacks on two different tasks, scene and object clas-
sification, when attacking three state-of-the-art deep neural
networks using three standard datasets. We will make the
code of the proposed approach and the whole evaluation
framework publicly available.
1. Introduction
Adversarial attacks perturb the intensity values of a clean
image to mislead machine learning classifiers, such as Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs). These perturbations can be re-
stricted [7, 16, 19, 22, 23, 26] or unrestricted [1, 13] with
respect to the pixel intensity values in the clean image. Re-
stricted perturbations, which are generated by controlling
some Lp norm, may restrain the maximum change for each
pixel (L∞ norm [7, 16, 19]), the maximum number of per-
turbed pixels (L0 norm [22, 26]), or the maximum energy
change (L2 norm [23]); whereas unrestricted perturbations
span a wider range determined by different colorization ap-
proaches [1, 13].
Defenses against adversarial attacks apply re-
quantization [29], median filtering [29] and JPEG
compression [4, 8] to remove adversarial perturbations
prior to classification, or improve the robustness of the
classifier through adversarial training [10] or by changing
the loss function [25]. The property of robustness of an ad-
versarial attack is the success rate of misleading a classifier
in the presence of defense frameworks. Most adversarial
attacks assume white-box settings, i.e. the attacker has full
knowledge of the architecture and parameters (and hence
gradients) of the model [7, 16, 19, 22, 23, 26]. However,
real-world restrictions may limit the exposed information
of a classifier to only query access (black-box settings)
or even no access (unseen classifier). The property of
transferability is the success rate of adversarial images in
misleading an unseen classifier [5]. Finally, the perturba-
tion in an adversarial image should be unnoticeable, i.e. the
shape and spatial arrangement of objects in the adversarial
image should be perceived as in the clean image, and the
colors should look natural.
Restricted perturbations [2, 16, 19, 23] often have high
spatial frequencies that can be detected by defenses [4, 8,
21, 29]. Moreover, restricted perturbations that are sparse
and with large changes in intensity are noticeable [22, 26].
Instead, unrestricted attacks arbitrarily can perturb inten-
sity values through a colorization [1] based on an expen-
sive training phase followed by per-image adversarial fine-
tuning. Alternatively, attacks can arbitrarily change the hue
and saturation components in the HSV color space [13].
However, even small variations can result in large, perceiv-
able distortions and unnatural colors (see Fig. 1(g)).
In this paper, we propose an unrestricted, content-based
adversarial attack that exploits the characteristics of the hu-
man visual system to selectively alter colors. The proposed
approach, ColorFool, operates only on the de-correlated
a and b channels of the perceptually uniform Lab color
space [27], without changing the lightness, L. Moreover,
ColorFool introduces perturbations only within a chosen
natural-color range for specific semantic categories [30] and
does not need knowledge of the parameters or gradients of
the attacked classifier (black-box). Finally, this adversar-
ial color perturbation can be generated for images of any
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Figure 1. Adversarial image generated for a sample (a) clean im-
age by (b) the proposed ColorFool, (c) BIM [16], (d) TI-BIM [7],
(e) DeepFool [23], (f) SparseFool [22] and (g) SemanticAdv [13].
BIM and DeepFool generate unnoticeable adversarial images with
restricted perturbations. ColorFool generates any size natural-
color adversarial images by considering the semantic information
and preserving the colors of regions within an image that the hu-
man vision system is more sensitive to, in this case the person. In
the bottom right, the predicted class.
size. We validate ColorFool in attacking three state-of-the-
art DNNs (ResNet50, ResNet18 [11] and AlexNet [15]) that
have been trained for scene and object classification tasks
using three datasets (ImageNet [6], CIFAR-10 [14] and Pri-
vate Places365 (P-Places365) [31]). We show that Color-
Fool generates natural-color adversarial images that are ef-
fective in terms of success rate in seen and unseen clas-
sifiers, robustness to defense frameworks on an extensive
comparison with five state-of-the-art attacks.
2. Adversarial attacks
Let X ∈ Zw,h,c be an RGB image with width w, height
h and c = 3 channels. Let M(·) be a DNN classifier that
predicts for a given image the most probable class, y =
M(X). An adversarial attack perturbs X and generates an
adversarial image, X˙, such that M(X˙) 6=M(X).
Adversarial attacks can be grouped into two categories,
namely restricted and unrestricted perturbations. An adver-
sarial image can be generated with a controlled perturbation
by L0, L1, L2 or L∞ norms. Adversarial attacks that use
restricted perturbations are BIM [16], TI-BIM [7], Deep-
Fool [23] and SparseFool [22]. Alternatively, an adversarial
image can be generated with an unrestricted perturbation on
the colors considering the preservation of the shape of the
objects, as in SemanticAdv [13] or BigAdv [1].
BIM [16] constrains the maximum perturbation of each
pixel by imposing an L∞-norm constraint. BIM searches
adversarial images by linearising the cost function, JM (·),
in the input space. The search starts from X˙0 = X and
iteratively moves in the direction of the gradient of the cost
of predicting y with respect to the clean image, ∇XJM (·),
with step size δ ≤  in each iteration:
X˙N = CX,
(
X˙N−1 + δ sign
(
∇XJM
(
θ, X˙N−1, y
)))
,
(1)
until M(X˙N ) 6= M(X) or a maximum number of itera-
tions, where θ are the parameters of M , sign(·) is the sign
function that determines the direction of the gradient of the
cost function andCX,(·) is the clipping function that main-
tains the adversarial images within the -neighborhood of
the clean image as well as image range Z:
CX,(X˙) = min
{
255,X+ ,max
{
0,X− , X˙
}}
. (2)
TI-BIM [7] generates BIM adversarial perturbations
over an ensemble of translated images to improve the trans-
ferability to unseen classifiers. As the gradients of a trans-
lated image correspond to translating the gradient of the
original image [7], TI-BIM convolves the gradient with a
pre-defined kernel W at each iteration:
X˙N = CX,
(
X˙N−1+δ sign
(
W∗∇XJM
(
θ, X˙N−1, y
)))
,
(3)
where W can be a uniform, linear or Gaussian kernel.
DeepFool [23] finds the minimal L2-norm adversarial
perturbation by finding the direction towards the closest de-
cision boundary. For example in the case of the binary clas-
sifier, adversarial images can iteratively be generated by
projecting the adversarial image of each iteration onto the
closest linearized decision boundary of M(·):
x˙N = x+ (1 + η)
N∑
n=1
− M(X˙n)‖∇M(X˙n)‖22
∇M(X˙n), (4)
where η  1 is a constant that is multiplied by the accu-
mulative adversarial perturbations to reach the other side of
the decision boundary. Note that DeepFool does not impose
constraints on pixel values, which may therefore lie outside
the permissible dynamic range of the image.
SparseFool [22] uses an L1-norm between the clean and
adversarial images to minimize the number of perturbed
pixels to exceed the closest decision boundary of the pre-
dicted class based on the geometry properties of M(·).
SparseFool leverages the fact that DNNs have a low mean
curvature in the neighborhood of each image [9] and gener-
ates sparse perturbations based on this curvature and adver-
sarial images on the closest L2 decision boundary. Sparse-
Fool approximates the decision boundary near to the clean
Table 1. Comparison of adversarial methods. An adversarial image is generated with a restricted perturbation by L0, L1, L2 and L∞ or
unrestricted perturbation on the Colors considering two Types: White- or Black-attack for two Tasks: Object and Scene classification.
Datasets with the number of chosen classes for the attack are reported for ImageNet, CIFAR-10 and Private-Places365 (P-Places365) with
1000, 10 and 60 classes as well (Unknown, if number of classes are not written in their papers). JSMA is tested on MNIST dataset.
Ref Attack Perturbation Type Attacked Model Datasets TaskImageNet CIFAR-10 P-Places365
[16] BIM L∞ W Inc-v3 1000 O
[7] TI-BIM L∞ W Inc-v3, Inc-v4, ResNet152 60 O
[19] P-FGSM L∞ W ResNet50 60 S
[23] DeepFool L2 W LeNet, CaffeNet, GoogleNet 1000 10 O
[22] SparseFool L1 W LeNet, ResNet18, Inc-v3, DenseNet,VGG16 U 10 O
[26] JSMA L0 W LeNet O
[2] CW L0,2,∞ W Inc-v3 1000 10 O
[1] BigAdv C W ResNet50, DenseNet121, VGG19 10 O
[13] SemAdv C B VGG16 10 O
ours ColorFool C B ResNet50, ResNet18, AlexNet 1000 10 60 O and S
image X by a hyperplane, vT X˙d, passing the minimal L2-
norm DeepFool adversarial image (i.e. Eq 4), X˙d, and a
normal vector v. Then, it iteratively finds the minimal L1-
norm projection of the clean image onto the approximated
decision boundary:
X˙N = P (X˙N−1 + δ∗) (5)
where P (·) ensures that the value of each pixel of adver-
sarial images are between l, u ∈ R, and δ∗ is the sparse
adversarial noise that each of its coordinate is iteratively
computed based on the projection of each adversarial im-
age, X˙n, towards its maximum unused coordinate of the
normal vector, d:
δ∗d =
|vT (X˙n − X˙d)|
|vd| sign(vd), (6)
where T is the transpose operator.
SemanticAdv [13] unrestrictedly changes colors in the
HSV color space by shifting the hue, H , and saturation, S,
values of the clean image while preserving the value chan-
nel, V , in order to not affect the shapes of objects:
X˙n = β(
[
XH + [δH ]
w,h,XS + [δS ]
w,h,XV
]
), (7)
where β(·) is a function that converts the intensities of an
image from RGB to HSV color space, XH and XS are
the original hue and saturation channels and δS , δH ∈ [0, 1]
are scalar random values. Eq. 7 is repeated until M(X˙n) 6=
M(X) or a maximum number of trials (1000) is reached.
BigAdv [1] aims to generate natural-color perturba-
tion by fine-tuning, for each X, a trained colorization
model [30], F (·), parametrised by θ with a cross-entropy
adversarial loss Jadv:
Jadv(M
(
F (XL,Ch,Lh; θ)
)
, y), (8)
where XL is the L channel of the image in the Lab color
space and Ch is the ground-truth color (color hints) for the
locations that are indicated by the binary location hint, Lh.
BigAdv de-colorizes the whole image and again colorizes
it, which makes it inefficient and it may severely distort the
colors if Ch and Lh are not carefully set.
Finally, ColorFool, our proposed approach (see Sec. 3),
is an unrestricted, black-box method like SemanticAdv.
However, SemanticAdv perturbs pixel intensities without
considering the content in an image thus often producing
unnatural colors. ColorFool instead perturbs colors only
in specific semantic regions and within a chosen range so
they can be still perceived as natural. The other state-of-the-
art unrestricted method, BigAdv is a white-box attack that
needs to train a colorization model to learn image statistics
from large datasets and to fine-tune it per each clean im-
age that can mislead the classifier. Table 1 summarizes the
adversarial attacks for object or scene classification tasks.
3. ColorFool
We aim to design a black-box adversarial attack that gen-
erates adversarial images with natural colors through gener-
ating low-frequency perturbations that are highly transfer-
able to unseen classifiers and robust to defenses. Moreover,
the attack shall operate on the native size of the images.
First, we identify image regions whose color is important
for a human observer as the appearance of these sensitive
regions is typically within a specific range (e.g. skin color).
Other (non-sensitive) image regions, instead, may have their
colors modified within an arbitrary range and still look nat-
ural [3]. We consider four categories of sensitive regions,
whose unusual colors would attract the attention of a hu-
man observer [3, 18, 30]: person, sky, vegetation (grass and
trees), and water (sea, river, waterfall, swimming pool, and
lake).
Let us decompose an image X into K semantic regions
S = {Sk : Sk = X ·Mk}Kk=1 , (9)
whereMk ∈ Rw,h is the k-th binary mask ofD(X), withD
Figure 2. Sample results of image semantic segmentation [32].
ColorFool identifies color sensitive semantic regions person (in or-
ange), vegetation (in green), sky (in light blue) and water (in dark
blue), and non-sensitive regions (in black).
a semantic classification algorithm. Specifically, we use as
D a pyramid Pooling R50-Dilated architecture of Cascade
Segmentation Module segmentation [33], trained on MIT
ADE20K dataset [32] on 150 semantic region types. Fig. 2
shows examples of the considered semantic regions.
We separate the sensitive regions, S = {Sk}Sk=1, from
non-sensitive regions, S = {Sk}Sk=1 regions. After identi-
fying these two sets of regions, we attack the image by ap-
propriately modifying the colors of the region in the percep-
tually uniform Lab color space [27], which separates color
information from brightness: a ranges from green (-128) to
red (+127), b ranges from blue (-128) to yellow (+127), and
L ranges from black (0) to white (100).
We modify the color of sensitive regions, Sk, to generate
the set S˙ as
S˙ = {S˙k : S˙k = γ(Sk) + α[0, Nak , N bk ]
T }Sk=1, (10)
where γ(·) converts the intensities of an image from the
RGB to the Lab color space, Nak ∈ N ak and N bk ∈ N bk are
the adversarial perturbations in the channels a and b that are
chosen randomly from the set of natural-color ranges [30],
N ak and N bk , in a and b channels. These ranges are de-
fined based on the actual colors, region semantics and prior
knowledge about the human perception of colors in that re-
gion (see Table 2). We allow multiple trials, until a pertur-
bation misleads the classifier. Let n be the index of the trial
and N be the maximum number of trials. To avoid large
color changes in the first trials, we progressively increase
the intensity through α = nN that scales the randomly cho-
sen perturbation.
We modify the color of non-sensitive regions, Sk, to pro-
duce the set S˙ as
S˙ = {S˙k : S˙k = γ(Sk) + α[0, Na, N b]
T
}Sk=1, (11)
whereN
a ∈ {−127, . . . , 128} andN b ∈ {−127, . . . , 128}
are adversarial perturbations chosen randomly inside the
Table 2. Adversarial color perturbation considered by ColorFool to
modify the colors of the sensitive semantic regions. The natural-
color ranges are chosen based on the color recommendation of
people to grey-scale objects [3, 18] that is also used as a ground-
truth colors in the colorization methods [30]. The adversarial
color perturbation of the k-th semantic region considers the ex-
treme values of the semantic class as lak = min(Sk) and u
a
k =
max(Sk). The adversarial perturbation is chosen randomly within
each natural-color range and apply as in Eq. 10. Note that we do
not change the color of persons within the image, as it attracts the
attention of a viewer more than others.
Semantic region a channel b channel
S1: Person N a1 = {0} N b1 = {0}
S2: Vegetation N a2 = {−128−la2 , . . . , −ua2} N b2 = {−lb2, . . . , 127−ub2}
S3: Water N a3 = {−128−la3 , . . . , −ua3} N b3 = {−128−lb3, . . . , −ub3}
S4: Sky N a4 = {−128−la4 , . . . , −ua4} N b4 = {−128−lb4, . . . , −ub4}
whole range of a and b, as the regions can undergo larger
intensity changes.
Finally, the adversarial image X˙ generated by ColorFool
combines the modified sensitive and non-sensitive image re-
gions as
X˙ = Q
(
γ−1
( S∑
k=1
S˙k +
S∑
k=1
S˙k
))
, (12)
where Q(·) is the quantization function that ensures that the
generated adversarial image is X˙ ∈ Zw,h,c and γ−1(·) is a
function that converts the intensities of an image from the
Lab to the RGB color space.
ColorFool repeats the process from Eq. 10 until
M(X˙) 6= M(X) or the maximum number of trials, N =
1000, is reached. For several examples of adversarial im-
ages generated by ColorFool see the supplementary mate-
rial.
4. Validation
Algorithms under comparison. We compare against all
of the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks discussed in Sec-
tion 2: Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [16], Translation-
Invariant BIM (TI-BIM) [7], DeepFool [23], Sparse-
Fool [22] and SemanticAdv [13]. We discard comparing
against BigAdv [1] as the code is not available and we found
the manuscript not objectively reproducible. We choose
these algorithms as they include restricted and unrestricted
attacks and they are known for generating adversarial im-
ages that are transferable (TI-BIM), unnoticeable (DF) and
robust to defenses (SemanticAdv). We also compare against
the simple yet successful BIM attack and SparseFool, a
sparse attack. Furthermore, we consider a modification of
the proposed method, named ColorFool-r, where no priors
are considered for the semantic regions. We use the au-
thors’ implementations for all adversarial attack methods
apart from SemanticAdv that we re-implemented in Py-
Torch. All adversarial examples are generated using the
same read/write framework, image filters and software ver-
sion in PyTorch and OpenCV to make the results compara-
ble.
Datasets. We evaluate on three datasets Private-Places365
(P-Places365) [31], a scene classification dataset; CIFAR-
10 [14], an object classification dataset; and ImageNet [6],
another object classification dataset. For P-Places365, we
employ a subset of classes that are defined as P-sensitive in
Mediaeval 2018 Pixel Privacy Challenge [17]. The private
subset of Places365 dataset includes 50 images per each of
the 60 private scene classes. For CIFAR-10, we use the
whole test set composed of 10K images of 10 different ob-
ject classes. For ImageNet, we consider the 1000 classes
and 3 random images per class from the validation set. All
the images are RGB with varying resolution except for the
images from CIFAR-10 whose dimensions are 32× 32 pix-
els.
Classifiers under attack. We conduct the attacks on
two different architectures: deep residual neural network
(ResNet [11], 18 layers (R18) and 50 layers (R50)) and
AlexNet (AN) [15]. We chose these classifiers to study the
transferability comparing both homogeneous (i.e. ResNet
classifiers) and heterogeneous architectures (AlexNet).
Performance measures. We quantify the success rate in
misleading a classifier, the robustness to defenses and the
image quality of the adversarial images. The success rate
(SR) is quantified as the ratio between the number of adver-
sarial images that mislead the classifier on its most-likely
predicted class and the total number of images. For the
transferability, we compute the SR of adversarial images
when misleading an unseen classifier. The robustness to de-
fenses is measured in three forms. Firstly, we quantify the
SR in seen classifiers of adversarial images after filtering.
As filters we use re-quantization [29] using 1 to 7 bits in
steps of 1; median filtering [29] with squared kernel of di-
mension 2, 3 and 5 and lossy JPEG compression [8, 4] with
JPEG quality parameter of 25, 50, 75 and 100. We report the
results on retrieving the class that was predicted on the clean
images with the most effective filter (i.e. the one that obtains
the lowest SR). Secondly, we report the undetectability as
the ratio between adversarial images not identified as adver-
sarials and the total number of images using feature squeez-
ing framework [29] when using the previously mentioned
image filters. Specifically, for each classifier and parame-
ter of each image filter, we compute a threshold that deter-
mines if an image is adversarial or benign by comparing the
L1 norm of the difference between the probability vector of
the given image and the same image after the image filter-
ing. Each threshold is calculated as the value that allows
for a 5% false-positive rate in detecting benign images on
Table 3. Success rate on Private-Places365 (P-Places365), CIFAR-
10 and ImageNet datasets; against ResNet50 (R50), ResNet18
(R18) and AlexNet (AN). The performance of these classifiers on
the clean images is presented in the first row. The higher the suc-
cess rate the most successful the attack. Key: AC, attacked clas-
sifier; TC, test classifier; Acc, accuracy. Grey/white-shadowed in-
dicates seen/unseen classifier. ColorFool is more transferable than
other adversarial attacks, except SemanticAdv that severely distort
the colors of all regions (see Fig. 5).
Attack Dataset P-Places365 CIFAR-10 ImageNet
AC
TC
R50 R18 AN R50 R18 AN R50 R18 AN
Acc. on clean images .554 .527 .466 .944 .935 .722 .726 .649 .517
BIM
R50 1.00 .284 .073 .999 .095 .021 .873 .123 .087
R18 .231 1.00 .081 .078 .999 .022 .143 .945 .099
AN .061 .081 1.00 .014 .013 .999 .088 .092 .944
TI-BIM
R50 .995 .339 .186 .843 .153 .173 .992 .235 .176
R18 .268 .996 .198 .083 .943 .138 .173 .997 .183
AN .157 .193 .995 .315 .349 .889 .121 .163 .994
DF
R50 .957 .107 .030 .829 .226 .064 .983 .071 .018
R18 .009 .969 .030 .234 .875 .076 .055 .991 .017
AN .021 .028 .956 .020 .024 .637 .017 .019 .993
SF
R50 .998 .151 .127 .999 .408 .186 .987 .167 .176
R18 .101 .999 .120 .353 .999 .216 .086 .997 .134
AN .070 .066 1.00 .130 .151 .999 .062 .079 .999
SA
R50 .936 .563 .713 .863 .429 .704 .889 .540 .769
R18 .480 .954 .714 .339 .898 .705 .422 .931 .757
AN .424 .466 .990 .155 .191 .993 .359 .431 .994
CF-r
R50 .963 .336 .514 .956 .255 .635 .948 .362 .608
R18 .275 .970 .501 .431 .954 .689 .235 .954 .580
AN .157 .171 .999 .065 .058 .999 .104 .137 .998
CF
R50 .959 .334 .491 .975 .254 .641 .917 .348 .592
R18 .267 .971 .475 .415 .971 .696 .223 .934 .543
AN .171 .157 .998 .059 .055 1.00 .114 .147 .995
a training dataset. Then, images with L1 norm difference
larger than the threshold are considered to be adversarials.
Thirdly, we evaluate the SR when attacking a seen classi-
fier trained with Prototype Conformity Loss (PCL) [25] and
adversarial training [10]. We quantify the image quality of
the adversarial with a non-reference perceptual image qual-
ity measure named neural image assessment (NIMA) [28]
trained on AVA dataset [24]. NIMA estimates the perceived
image quality and it has been shown effective to automati-
cally estimate the preferences of images by humans [17].
Success rate. Table 3 shows the SR on a seen classifier (on-
diagonal elements) and transferability to unseen classifiers
(off-diagonal elements). All adversarial attacks achieve
high SR in a seen classifier for most of the classifiers and
datasets. However, restricted attacks never achieve a SR
higher than 0.41 in unseen classifiers; while unrestricted at-
tacks achieve a SR of up to 0.77. ColorFool achieves a high
SR on both seen and unseen classifiers with, for example,
0.97 when both attacking and testing in R18 in CIFAR-
10 and 0.69 and 0.41 when evaluated with AN and R50,
respectively. However, other attacks only achieve SRs of
0.02 (BIM), 0.14 (TI-BIM), 0.07 (DeepFool), 0.21 (Sparse-
Fool). A possible reason is that restricted attacks such as
BIM iteratively overfit to the parameters of the specific clas-
sifier, which means that the adversarial images rarely mis-
lead other classifiers, while the randomness in changing the
color in ColorFool prevents this overfitting. TI-BIM aims
at addressing the overfitting of BIM and achieves higher
transferability than BIM, while its SR in seen classifiers de-
creases. Unconstrained attacks obtain high transferability
rates. For instance, SemanticAdv, CF-r and CF obtain SRs
of 0.71, 0.69 and 0.70 when attacking ResNet18 and eval-
uating in AlexNet. While ColorFool outperforms Seman-
ticAdv with seen classifiers, SemanticAdv obtains higher
transferability rates. This is due to the large color changes
that SemanticAdv introduces in all parts of the image, in-
cluding the ones that are more informative to the classi-
fier (higher transferability) but also to regions of the image
that sensitive to the human vision system, thus, generating
highly unnatural-looking images (see Fig. 5). Further in-
sights are discussed in the image quality analysis later in
this section. As previously studied [20], adversarial images
generated on stronger classifiers (e.g. R50) show a higher
transferability rate when tested on weaker classifiers (e.g.
AN). This behavior can be observed, for instance, when
looking at the results of ColorFool in P-Places365. Adver-
sarial images crafted with R50 obtain a SR of 0.96 which
decreases to 0.49 when tested in AN. However, when ad-
versarial images are crafted with AN the SR is 0.99, but
when tested in R50 (a stronger classifier) the SR is of only
0.17.
Robustness to defenses. The SR after applying the three
image filters is depicted in Fig. 3. Restricted attacks such
as DeepFool and SparseFool are the least robust to image
filtering, as these filters can remove restricted adversarial
noises (especially L0 sparse adversarial perturbation) prior
to the classification and correctly classify around 70% of
them. BIM and TI-BIM obtain higher SR than other re-
stricted attacks in P-Places365 and ImageNet but similar
in CIFAR-10. The most robust attacks are the unrestricted
ones where SemanticAdv, ColorFool-r and ColorFool con-
sistently obtain a SR above 60% across datasets and mod-
els. A robust adversarial attack should be undetectable not
only by a specific image filter but by any. The undetectabil-
ity results (Fig. 4) show that restricted attacks are more de-
tectable than unrestricted ones when considering all image
filters across all classifiers and datasets. For instance, when
attacking R50 in P-Places365, BIM, TI-BIM, DF and SF
obtain undetectability rates of 5%, 19%, 1% and 11% when
considering all types of image filtering. Meanwhile, unre-
stricted attacks such as SemanticAdv, ColorFool-r and Col-
orFool obtain 73%, 72% and 75%. We believe that one rea-
son for this is related to the frequency component of the
Table 4. Success rate of BIM, TI-BIM, DeepFool (DF), Sparse-
Fool (SF), SemanticAdv (SA), ColorFool-r (CF-r) and ColorFool
(CF) against ResNet110 trained with softmax, on Prototype Con-
formity Loss (PCL) [25] and its conjunction with adversarial train-
ing (AdvT) [10] on CIFAR-10. The higher the success rate, the
more robust the attack. In bold, the best performing attack.
Training BIM TI-BIM DF SF SA CF-r CF[16] [7] [23] [22] [13] ours ours
Softmax .969 .963 .855 .994 .867 .992 .994
PCL .560 .619 .784 .801 .896 1.00 1.00
PCL+AdvT .500 .577 .665 .691 .966 .998 .999
generated adversarial perturbations. Restricted attacks gen-
erate high-frequency adversarial perturbations, whereas un-
restricted attacks generate low-frequency perturbations (see
Fig.5). Low-frequency perturbations (those generated by
unrestricted attacks) are more robust to re-quantization, me-
dian filtering and JPEG compression. In general, JPEG
compression is the most effective detection framework.
When we consider all of the filters applied, as an example,
to P-Places365, the restricted attacks BIM, TI-BIM, Deep-
Fool and SparseFool are detectable in 95%, 81%, 99% and
89% of the times. However, unrestricted attacks such as
SemanticAdv and ColorFool-r are detectable only 27% of
the times and the proposed ColorFool is the least detectable
with only 25%.
Another observation is that the robustness of the adver-
sarial images is proportional to the accuracy of the classi-
fier used for their generation (see Figs. 3, 4). For exam-
ple, misleading a high-accuracy DNN such as R50 with al-
most 0.95 accuracy on CIFAR-10 dataset needs bigger ad-
versarial perturbations that make adversarial images more
robust but detectable. Table 4 shows the SR of adversarial
attacks in misleading ResNet110 [11] trained on CIFAR-
10 as well as the robustness to an improved training pro-
cedure based on PCL [25] and its conjunction with adver-
sarial training [10]. For the adversarial training, ResNet110
is trained using clean and adversarial images generated by
BIM that is the strongest defense [12]. Interestingly, Table 4
shows that ColorFool is robust as its SR remains above 99%
when misleading ResNet110 equipped with both PCL and
adversarial training defenses. However, the SR of restricted
adversarial attacks drops by 50%.
Quality. Adversarial samples are shown in Fig. 5. For
instance, even though the restricted methods such as TI-
BIM or SparseFool generate adversarial images with min-
imal perturbations, they are noticeable. SemanticAdv and
ColorFool-r generate unrealistic colors. However, even
if ColorFool generates adversarial images that are differ-
ent from the clean images (in an Lp meaning), they look
natural. Moreover, ColorFool generates images with the
same dimensions as the clean images. The results of
the image quality evaluation are shown in Table 5. Un-
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Figure 3. Robustness of BIM, TI-BIM (TI-B), DeepFool (DF), SparseFool (SF), SemanticAdv (SA), ColorFool-r (CF-r) and ColorFool
(CF) on ResNet50, ResNet18 and AlexNet against re-quantization ( ), median filtering ( ) and JPEG compression ( ) on P-Places365,
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet.
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Figure 4. Undetectability (y-axis) of BIM, TI-BIM, Deep-
Fool, SparseFool, SemanticAdv, ColorFool-r and Color-
Fool, when attacking R50, R18 and AN classifiers (first, second
and third square of each color, respectively) using re-quantization,
median filtering and JPEG compression. The higher the unde-
tectability, the more robust the attack is to defenses.
restricted attacks obtain the highest NIMA scores across
all attacks, classifiers and datasets. Specifically, in P-
Places365 and ImageNet, ColorFool-r and ColorFool ob-
tain the highest scores (over 5.19). For CIFAR-10, Semanti-
cAdv, ColorFool-r and ColorFool obtain similar results with
scores over 4.96. This implies that adversarial images gen-
Table 5. Image quality with NIMA (the higher the better) of adver-
sarial images from P-Places365, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets
for all adversarial attacks against ResNet-50 (R50), ResNet-18
(R18) and AlexNet (AN). We report only the mean value as the
standard deviations are similar across all attacks with typical val-
ues of 4.4. KEY: AC, attacked classifier. In bold the best perform-
ing attack per classifier and dataset.
Dataset P-Places365 CIFAR-10 ImageNet
Attack
AC
R50 R18 AN R50 R18 AN R50 R18 AN
Clean 5.02 5.02 5.02 4.91 4.91 4.91 5.23 5.23 5.23
BIM 4.88 4.88 4.85 4.90 4.90 4.92 4.88 4.89 4.87
TI-BIM 4.92 4.92 4.86 4.92 4.92 4.95 4.83 4.83 4.77
DF 4.95 4.94 4.94 4.88 4.88 4.92 4.93 4.93 4.92
SF 4.99 4.99 4.97 4.86 4.86 4.87 4.97 4.96 4.94
SA 5.05 5.05 5.06 5.01 5.01 4.98 4.80 4.79 4.80
CF-r 5.24 5.22 5.20 5.05 5.04 4.96 5.24 5.25 5.23
CF 5.22 5.22 5.19 5.04 5.03 4.96 5.24 5.24 5.23
erated by ColorFool do not deteriorate the perceived im-
age quality while restricted methods such as DeepFool or
SparseFool obtain slightly lower results. Interestingly, Col-
orFool obtains equal or higher NIMA scores than the clean
images considering all datasets and classifiers.
Randomness analysis. As ColorFool generates random
perturbations, we analyze what is the effect of this random-
Clean BIM [16] TI-BIM [7] DF [23] SF [22] SA [13] CF-r CF
nursing room
butchers shop butchers shop army base army base florist shop
medina throne room
volleyball
horse cart horse cart horse cart bubble bubble
maypole horse cart
Figure 5. Adversarial image samples from Private-Places365 (first row) and ImageNet (last row) datasets generated by BIM, TI-BIM,
DeepFool (DF), SparseFool (SF), SemanticAdv (SA), a variation of the proposed ColorFool-r (CF-r) and the proposed ColorFool (CF).
Please note that CF-r and CF generate examples at the native image resolution. In the bottom right, the predicted class.
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Figure 6. Influence of the randomness in the generation of adver-
sarial images with ColorFool with 500 random initializations on
the success rate, the number of trials to converge and the num-
ber of different final classes at convergence with thirteen random
images (x-axis) from ImageNet when attacking ResNet50.
ness regarding the success rate, the number of trials to con-
verge and whether the final class varies. We execute Color-
Fool 500 times with thirteen random images from ImageNet
belong to different classes for attacking ResNet50. We se-
lect ResNet50 for this analysis as it is the most accurate
classifier among the consider ones. Fig. 6 shows the SR,
the statistics (median, min, max, 25 percentile and 75 per-
centile) of the number of trials to converge and the number
of classes that the executions converge to. Results for dif-
ferent images are shown on the x-axis. We can observe that
the number of trials that ColorFool requires to converge re-
mains with a low median and standard deviation for images
that always succeed in misleading the classifier (see the first
and second plot in Fig. 6). Finally, most of the executions
for a given image converge to the same class (see median
value in the third plot in t Fig. 6) regardless of the random-
ness.
5. Conclusion
We proposed a novel black-box adversarial attack, Col-
orFool, that changes the color of semantic regions within
an image, based on priors of the human perception to col-
ors. ColorFool achieves state-of-the-art results regarding
success rate in misleading seen and unseen classifiers, ro-
bustness to defenses that employ image filtering, adversar-
ial training or improve the loss function as well as being less
detectable than restricted attacks, especially to JPEG com-
pression. Furthermore, ColorFool generates adversarial im-
ages with the same size as the clean images. We hope that
our work encourages future studies on adversarial attacks
that simultaneously consider the human visual system and
the semantic information of the objects in the image, and
new defenses against colorization to make DNNs robust to
color changes.
As future work, we will study the use of colorization
adversarial attacks for improving the robustness of DNNs
trough adversarial training, evaluate existing adversarial at-
tacks under other defenses, study advanced perceptual im-
age quality algorithms as well as explore the behavior of
colorization adversarial attacks in tasks such as object de-
tection and image semantic segmentation.
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